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The allocation of resources is a problem which is faced by all
decision makers whether they be public servants or private entrepre-
neurs. Increasingly these decisions have required more information
than can generally be obtained through the decentralized pricing
system of perfect competition. Many of the so called social problems
of today, specifically environmental pollution, are deeply rooted in
economic concepts which seem to cause allocations which are not Pare-
to optimal if determined by the market alone. This paper is confined
to the study of two of the more important of these concepts, collective
goods and external effects (or externalities).
The basic economic structure utilized is that of perfect competition
under a criteria of Pareto optimality. After characterizing the Pare-
to optimal conditions for a world of private goods with complete infor-
mation, separate models were described which included externalities and
collective goods. It is shown that if a Pareto optimal solution is
to be gained certain conditions exist which must be satisfied. The
difficulty in attaining such equilibrium conditions is then discussed
with a dynamic connotation for pedagogical purposes only. The general
conclusions are drawn that when collective goods and external economies
and diseconomies are present the market system or mechanism alone will
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"Environmental pollution, the unfavorable alteration of our sur-
roundings, and its attendant problems govern the dynamics of the health
and the economic and social well being of man." [Ref. 9].
Such statements have done much in recent years to focus attention
upon environmental problems. That • is , to increase the awareness of
many persons, both in government and industry, to conditions which
previously concerned only the conservationists. A number of govern-
mental agencies have studied various aspects of the environment and
their reports contain many technical details of the pollution problem.
Unfortunately, although the specific problems have been fairly well
defined, proposed solutions to most of the more serious conditions are
lacking. It is clear that as technology and population continue to
grow, the pollution of the environment will continue to grow at a
similar rate if unchecked. Therefore, it is imperative that plans be
developed and implemented for environmental cleanup and waste disposal.
One should not imply from this, however, that nothing in the way
of pollution control has been accomplished. There have been several
isolated examples of concerted efforts to clean up a river or to
eliminate sources of air pollution. Included among these are the very
successful programs carried out by the City of Pittsburghto purify its
air and by the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission in elimin-
ating a great portion of the Ohio River pollution. Even though these
programs are considered successful, they have by no means been easy to
Butrico, Frank A., "Environmental Pollution in America," Current History
,
October 1968, p. 225. Footnote 2 lists some of the more important reports

accomplish nor have they been all inclusive in their effect. The
Pittsburgh plan "has been and continues to be a bitter, emotionally charged
battle to keep the atmosphere pure enough to breathe and clean enough
to see through". The Ohio River project was initiated in 1948, yet in
1966 there were still a number of industries located along the river
that had failed to assume any responsibility for improving the water
condition [Ref. 20].
The problem of environmental pollution control is a complex one
spanning many disciplines. The purpose of this paper is to investi-
gate the economic theory which can be related to the use of the
environment and to examine in general the economic theory of public
expenditure. Basically this study will examine the concepts of
externalities and collective goods, pointing out their applicability
to the pollution problem and the failure of the market system of
decentralized pricing to cope with such wide ranging "public" problems.
The terms "market failure" and "market inefficiency" are widely used
throughout the literature to describe the inability of the pricing
system to attain the true Pareto optimal point of a given market
structure. They are, however, persuasive terms which could easily
be interpreted in the literal sense that the market system is of no
use at all. Actually the pricing system is employed in many situations
to develop a solution which may not be Pareto optimal in the strict
theoretical manner but is, say, the "second best" position. In this
sense the market has not "failed" and to imply that it had would be
wrong. Due to the almost universal usage throughout welfare economic
literature, however, the term "market failure" will be used in a
similar manner in this paper.

Although much of the economic literature has had a tendency to
treat externalities as exceptional cases, it will be shown that at
least in the area of environmental pollution (and other public prob-
lems) the concept of an external effect is central to the issue. The
simple "ad hoc" arrangements which have been suggested to deal with
the misallocation of resources due to externalities may no longer be
adequate to contend with the immense present day problems. The simple
analyses presented herein should serve to illustrate the fact that much
more study in the area of "political economy" is necessary before
economists may give more useful advice to the decision makers who are
searching for solutions to these problems.

II. PURE PRIVATE GOODS WORLD
Perhaps a logical starting point would be a brief discussion of the
basic principles of modern welfare economics. Welfare economics is
really the normative aspect of economics as compared with the positive
aspect. Whereas positive economics deals with the determination of
results achieved under a given economic structure, normative economics
is concerned with the relative merits of various economic systems.
Positive economics is scientific in nature with its assumptions and
conclusions subject to empirical testing to determine their validity.
Welfare economics on the other hand is based upon assumptions which
are largely value judgments and defy empirical or logical testing to
establish their validity. If, however, we are given value judgments
which define some state of the economy then the techniques of positive
economics can be used to determine the feasibility of attaining that
state under a certain economic structure. It is generally concluded
that "the primary objective of welfare economics is to provide a guide
for distinguishing between "desirable" and "undesirable" states of the
economy" [Ref. 33]. Certainly the realization of the objective depends
primarily upon the manner in which "desirable" state of the economy is
defined. In effect the preferences of individuals form the fundamental
basis for determining the desirability of a state of the economy. Since
there is no obvious way to combine individual preferences, it becomes
extremely difficult in many cases to choose the most desirable of
several alternative economic states. (States of the economy may differ
in many respects: competitive, monopolistic, and multimarket are some
examples. A different allocation of resources normally characterizes
each state.) {Ref. 22, 33].
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Although welfare economics encompasses a broad spectrum of economic
ideas, the central theorem of welfare economics deals with the equilibrium
2
conditions of a competitive market. Ayres and Kneese provide a very
concise summary:
"Modern welfare economics concludes that if (1) preference
orderings of consumers and production functions of producers
are independent and their shapes appropriately constrained,
(2) consumers maximize utility subject to given income and
price parameters, and (3) producers maximize profits subject
to the price parameters; a set of prices exists such that no
individual can be made better off without making some other
individual worse off. For a given distribution of income
this is an efficient state." [Ref. 1]
Appropriately constrained as used in the quotation above implies regu-
larly smooth and quasi concave utility functions and production
functions. These assumptions will continue to apply throughout this
paper. In order to facilitate understanding of the ideas to be pre-
sented later concerning externalities, a general development of the
Pareto optimal conditions for a purely competitive private goods world
is necessary.
Private goods refer to those normally considered in economic
literature. That is, they are unshared goods; consumption by one
individual prevents consumption of that unit by another. Samuelson
[Ref. 34] defines a private consumption good as those which can be
parcelled out to different individuals such that the total available
equals the sum of that received by each individual. Consider, then,
The major hypothesis of perfect competition as far as consumers are
concerned is that the price of a commodity is not varied by the con-
sumption level of an individual consumer. Also the prices of labor
and privately owned resources are not affected by the sales of a
single consumer. Perfect competition also dictates to firms that one
alone cannot affect the price of a given commodity by varying its out-
put of that commodity. Prices are varied in the market system but by
aggregate supply and demand rather than individual.

a world of s individuals, k activities (producers) and m commodities.
Assume that each firm uses each commodity either as an input or an
output and that each commodity appears in the utility function of
every consumer.
Let: X, (h = 1,2,..., in) be the quantity of the h commodity.
x (h = l,2,...,m); (j = l,2,...,k) be the quantity of the
h commodity supplied by the j firm.
x^
h
(h = 1,2,. ...m); (j = 1,2 k) ; (i = 1,2 s) be the
quantity of the h commodity supplied by the j firm
and demanded by the i consumer.




1 (x^, x\>, ..., xj
m
); (j = 1,2,..., k)
k .
Ex., is the quantity of X, consumer i consumes. The "goods" consumed
also include the factors such as labor which the consumer provides as
inputs to producers. In effect an individual is trying to maximize his
consumption of outputs and at the same time minimize his total of in-
puts supplied. Thus by using proper signs both outputs and inputs can
be included in the utility function.
Each firm is faced with a production function which has the implicit
form
(2) Fj (x^, x^2 , ..., n
l
) = 0; (i = 1,2, ...,s)
As with the utility function the x., 's can represent either outputs or
factors of production depending upon their sign.
The goal of this hypothetical world is to simultaneously maximize
all consumer's utility subject to the constraints imposed by the pro-
duction functions. Recall from traditional textbook definitions the
meaning of Pareto optimality; among consumers a distribution of goods
10

is Pareto optimal if every reallocation of goods results in a reduction
of utility for at least one consumer. Similarly production is Pareto
optimal if every reallocation of inputs among firms causes the output
level of at least one firm to decrease. The positive economic analysis
of perfect competition has demonstrated that at equilibrium the necessary
conditions for Pareto optimality are satisfied. Such analysis does not,
however, give a unique point at which welfare is maximized. Instead we
find an infinite number of points which satisfy the Pareto optimal con-
ditions; that is, an efficiency or Pareto optimal frontier. Each point
has the Pareto optimal characteristic that movement away from it must
always hurt one person while helping another. In order to determine the
"ideal" state of this world or to judge the relative desirability of all
the alternative points the society must make further value judgments [Ref
.
22, 33].
The impossibility of Pareto optimality alone to determine the "bliss"
point of society has led to development of the social welfare function
concept. A social welfare function is a rule for ranking states of the
economy in terms of social desirability and uses as its basic data source
the individual preferences of all members of the community. Samuelson
refers to the social welfare function as a set of norms which renders
interpersonal judgments and which has the special property that at each
point a move by each man to higher indifference curve results in increased
3
social welfare. The general form of the social welfare function is
3Samuelson, Paul A., "Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Ex-
pendature," The Review of Economics and Statistics
,
Nov 1955, p. 351-352
A great deal has been written in recent years concerning the social wel-
fare function. It is not the purpose of this paper to examine the pre-
mises and assumptions upon which the concept is based, but rather to
employ the concept in the analysis at hand. Interested readers may pur-
sue the topic more fully especially in Human Values and Economic Policy
,
edited by Sidney Hook (New York University Press, New York, 1967).
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where U is the utility function of the i consumer. Additionally
the social welfare function satisfies
(3a) — . > for all i.
Thus determination of the welfare optimum becomes a problem of
maximizing the social welfare function subject to the production
function or
(4) Maximize W[U x (x* )]; (i - l,2,...,s)
Jh
(5) Subject to FJ (x.,. x* . . . , x* ) <N
'
J jl' j2 jm —




(7) L = W(U\ IT, ..., us ) - S \ FJ (x] x) ,...,*] )
At optimality the following conditions must be satisfied
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(9a) Fj (x* x* ..., x
1
) <jl j2 jm —
(9b) \ [Fj (x^, . ..)] -
From (9) it can be seen that if the optimal quantity of x., is positive
thenequation (8) holds with strict equality. Also since \. > then
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(9a) holds with strict equality when X. is positive. Now comparing any




J h = l!i
(10)
auL <*i_
ox .,, ox.,,jh jh»
The left hand side of (10) is called the rate of commodity substitution
(RCS) for consumer i between goods h and h'. The right hand side is
known as the rate of product transformation (RPT) for firm j between
goods h and h'
.
Harking back to the descriptive analysis of perfect competition,
recall the important results at equilibrium whereby the RCS between
any two goods were equal for all consumers. Analogously the RPT
between any two goods were equal for all firms. Also recall that in
perfect competition the prices faced by all consumers and producers
for a given good are the same. One additional result of this analysis
is necessary for our purposes here and that is the fact that the rates
of commodity substitution and product transformation are, at equilibrium,
equal to the price ratio of the commodities involved.
Now how do these results apply to the situation in which a social
welfare function is included in the analysis? First notice from
equations (8), (9) and (9a) that there are the same number of equations
as unknowns. (The unknowns are the x., 's which are positive and the
X.'s which are positive.) Thus the welfare optimum can be completely
characterized and, in theory at least, optimal values of all commodities
can be determined. The structure of the problem ensures that the
equilibrium allocation will be Pareto optimal. Equation (lO)verifies
13

that the rates of commodity substitution are the same for all consumers
and also equal to the rates of product transformation for all firms.
The foregoing analysis falls into the category of equilibrium
analyses. Nothing is said nor implied as to whether the equilibrium
point as described can actually be attained. Since equilibrium in its
most restrictive sense implies a state of affairs in which things are
at rest, the study of such a condition would not give a great deal of
insight to the questions at hand. What really is more important and
more interesting are the laws of change that an equilibrium suggests.
The tendencies to move toward or away from the equilibrium point are
actually more significant in many cases than the characteristics of
the point itself. When one begins to discuss methods by which such an
optimal allocation can be achieved one enters the realm of disequilibrium
analysis which deals with a process as compared to the static condition
of equilibrium. Thus this discussion will include sections of dynamics
as well as equilibrium analysis. Special mention will not again be
made when a shift of emphasis occurs.
Most economists concur in the conclusion that for perfect competition
the Pareto optimal allocation can be achieved through a market type
system in which prices of commodities become the motive force pushing
toward equilibrium. This is referred to as a decentralized system
because each individual and firm can decide for himself whether his
situation is optimal and if not can take individual and separate action
to make it so. There is no centralized authority necessary to specify
what is produced, how much is produced and who gets it. There is, how-
ever, the "invisible hand" which guides all consumers and firms through
the pricing system to equilibrium.
14

A vital consideration which enters into such a system is that of
ownership. That is, the goods and services which form the economic
system must be able to have a price assigned to them. For the most
part this requires two things. First the goods and services must be
owned; property rights must be in effect. Secondly and maybe more
important, some method of excluding the benefits of the good or ser-
vice from those who do not pay for them must be available. Musgrave
[Ref. 28] flatly states that the exclusion principle must apply if a
market mechanism is to function properly.
There are a number of situations where the market mechanism as
described by the foregoing disequilibrium discussion seems to require
modification for the efficient allocation of resources. If left to
the price forces of the market alone a non-optimal position will be
attained and the social welfare function will not be optimized. It
is not within the scope of this paper to investigate all of these
aspects of the market mechanism but rather to focus attention upon






It has been said that externality dominates theoretical welfare
economics [Ref. 7]. The literature, however, agrees only in that the
concept of external effects is difficult to define and almost impossible
to analyze. In many instances writers have grouped several distinct
types of market inefficiencies under the common heading of externality
when some, such as that caused by risk and uncertainty, have very
little, if any, connection with the more common thoughts concerning
external effects. Before conducting an equilibrium analysis of the
market in which external economies and diseconomies become important,
it is first necessary to gain an understanding of the concept.
Viner first made a critical distinction between what are called
pecuniary external economies and technological external economies but
they both dealt only with firms and their long run supply curves.
Pecuniary external economies will cause the long run supply curve of
an industry to decrease because an input price decreases and the demand
for it increases. Technological external economies consist of other
4improvements in efficiency which are not reflected in input prices.
Although not used in Viner' s strictest sense, the term technological
externality has come to encompass most of what we now consider to be
market external effects.
4
Bator, Francis M., "The Anatomy of Market Failure," Quarterly Journal
of Economics
,
Aug 1958. Pecuniary externalities or economies of scale
are not to be considered further herein. They are mentioned because
(a) the term does arise several times throughout the literature with
inadequate explanation and (b) the original Marshal-Pigou proposition
concerning externalities were really talking of pecuniary externalities
although their tax-subsidy conclusions actually remain applicable to
what we now call technological externalities.
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Buchanan and Stubblebine [Ref. 7] have proposed perhaps the most
general definition of externality and one which has probably gained
the most far reaching acceptance. According to their definition, an
externality is present when the utility of an individual is dependent
not only upon activities under their own control, but also upon other
activities under control of another individual. An activity as used
in this context means "any distinguishable human action that may be
measured". Although they speak only in terms of consumers, the same
definition applies to the producing sector if "utility of an individual"
is replaced by "output of a firm". An external economy exists when
increasing an activity causes an increase in utility (or output for a
firm). Conversely an external diseconomy implies disutility or
decreased output from an activity increase.
The effects just described have also been referred to as the
general doctrine of direct interdependence or direct interaction.
In reference to the perfect competition market system "direct" infers
that the interdependence does not operate through the market mechanism.
These interactions can be broken down into several distinct types,
each of which has been studied separately many times. They are: (a)
consumer-consumer, (b) consumer-producer, (c) producer-consumer, (d)
producer-producer, and (e) collective interaction. Each will be dis-
cussed in turn in the paragraphs to follow.
First consider consumer -consumer interaction whereby an indivi-
dual's utility is not only dependent upon the goods and services which
he consumes or renders but also upon the consumption of others. For
instance an individual may derive satisfaction from the fact that




children). Another consumer-consumer relationship which is extremely
important (especially in the light of opening statements of this paper)
concerns the "spill over" effect of one individual's consumption upon
another. Essentially these are the residuals of consumption which are
not completely assimilated by the environment over which an individual
holds specific property rights. Consumption in this context includes
full utilization of the service provided by the good and is not meant
to imply a separate production activity by consumers. Examples are
automobile exhaust, trash and garbage; we all pollute each other
[Ref. 12].
Consumer-producer interaction occurs when a consumer effects a
producer's output in ways other than services offered and demand for
products. Although examples of this are difficult to enumerate,
Skitovsky [Ref. 37] offers the instance where inventions which facilitate
production become available to producers free of charge.
The third category of interaction, producer-consumer, is an extremely
common one which has concerned many writers for years. The interaction
arises from the fact that consumers utility not only depends upon the
goods and services produced by the firm and obtained through the market
mechanism, but also upon "residuals of production" which normally are
a disutility to the individuals involved. Such conditions have resulted
in much of what is now considered environmental pollution; smoke, slag,
waste discharged to rivers and streams and so forth.
These are sometimes referred to as "psychic" external effects. Such
externalities are difficult, if not impossible, to measure and thus
are not considered in Buchanan's development. One can think of many
examples, however, whereby a person's utility (or happiness) has been
lessened through envy of another's consumption. Skitovsky [Ref. 37]
has indicated that this interdependence is the major cause of the
"reluctance of economists to make any welfare statements concerning the
18

Direct interaction between producers occurs when the output of a
firm depends upon the activities of other firms in addition to the
actual factors required for production. As an example consider a firm
which must filter and purify its air prior to entry into its factory
because of smoke particles emitted by a neighboring factory. The clean
air factory has no direct control over the amount of smoke particles in
the air and thus is required to provide purification which would be
unnecessary if the neighboring firm were absent. Much of the classical
work in external effects has been concerned with this type externality
and it was in this context that Pigou's tax-subsidy proposals were
first advanced.
Collective interaction can be characterized by social services
provided, equally and free of charge to all persons, by the community
through its government. The importance of external effects which are
generated in this manner has been shown in Samuelson's analysis of
collective consumption (public) goods [Ref. 34, 35, 36]. Public goods
will be discussed more in detail later but suffice it to say for now
that Samuelson's public goods exhibit external effects to an extreme
degree [Ref. 37, 2].
Now that a fairly detailed description of the actions which com-
prise an external economy or diseconomy has been set forth, the develop-
ment of this investigation could proceed in either of two directions.
First, an attempt could be made to delineate the various causes for
interaction which would appear to be extremely important if solutions
to the market failure problem are to be proposed. Secondly (and the
"Causes for interaction" refer to such concepts as nonappropriability
of resources, ownership (or lack of ownership) problems and exclusion
difficulties and cost. Bator [Ref. 2] discusses these aspects at




path which will be followed) is to discuss mathematically the effect
external economies and diseconomies have on the perfect competition
equilibrium model previously outlined. It must be remembered that
this is an institution free equilibrium analysis. Transfer costs,
information costs, government regulation and other typical institutional
mechanisms are to be ignored.
To begin such an analysis let us first redefine the utility and
production functions. Assume for complete generality that each indi-
vidual's utility is a function of not only his own consumption but
also the consumption of every other individual in the community.
Similarly each firm's production function depends upon the outputs
and inputs for every other firm. Therefore the utility function is of
the form
,... „i ..i, 1 1 12 2 2 s s s
(11) U -U (Xjl , xj2 ,..., x.m , x. 15 x. 2 ,..., x.m ,..., Xjl ,xj2 ,..., x. m )
j (j = 1,2,. ..,k).
and implicit production functions are
,..v J , i i i i i i i i i >. <
nK.^) t <xn , x 12 ,..., x lm , x21 , x22 ,..., x2m ,..., xkl , xk2 ,..., xkm ;
.
i (i = 1,2,. .. ,s)
Forming a Lagrangian function similar to (7)
k
(13) L = W(I 1 ,U2 ,...,U
S
) - E X. Fj
j=l J
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(15) Fj (*) <
J
Again if the optimal quantity of a commodity is positive the
equations of (14) must hold with strict equality. The system of
equations can be solved although very often the computational diffi-
culties may be extreme. The structure of the problem again assures
that the solution will be Pareto optimal.
The completely general case described above, in which all types of
consumer and producer interactions are involved, becomes very difficult
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to analyze and isolation of the effects is nearly impossible. Addition-
ally situations in the real world which must account for all external
effects simultaneously are extremely rare. For these reasons certain
assumptions will be made in order to facilitate the discussion and to
allow more meaningful conclusions to be drawn.
First consider only externalities between consumers and those con-
cerning producer initiated external effects which cause consumer's
utility to be altered. Then (14) becomes
1 .1 " "i .1 j ^ 1
ox., 1=2 ox., ox.,jh jh jh
(16)





The term £ W. —r- represents the effect upon all other consumers of
i=2 ox.,
Jh
the consumption by individual one of the quantity x., of the h com-
modity produced by the j firm. In attempting to equate RCS with RPT
it becomes clear that strict equality is not possible. In addition to
considering an individual's RCS between two goods the combined effect
of the consumption upon all other consumers must also be included.
Economists normally refer to this condition as a divergence between
benefit and cost. That is, if, through the market system, prices are
used to determine the amount of good to be produced (and consumed)
there will be an inequity when compared to the "optimal" amount of the
good required to satisfy the entire society.
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To see why this occurs first examine the effect upon other indivi-
duals in the community. It has already been assumed that W. > for
all individuals. Thus the term £ W. —r— could be positive, negative
i=2 dx.,
or zero depending upon each consumer's change in utility with an
increase of person one's consumption. There is no requirement that
each individual be effected in the same "amount" or even in the same
manner; some could experience an increase in utility while others
suffered a decrease. What becomes more important than individual
effects, however, is the cumulative effect which the summation above
represents. If this is positive, which in this pedagogically dynamic
discussion represents an overall social utility greater than that
gained by person one alone, then the pure competition model will cause
only that amount to be produced which satisfies person one. Thus
society experiences an underproduction of the good. Conversely, should
a cumulative diseconomy result from person one's consumption of good
. x., , the pricing system of determining the optimal output will cause
more to be produced than is actually optimal for the community. If
there were some manner to compute the cumulative "social utils" of the
community and if a mechanism existed whereby this could be equated to
the cost of production, then a Pareto optimal output would be deter-
mined. The fact that these mechanisms do not exist has given rise to
the common economic view that when external economies and diseconomies
are present the market system causes a divergence between private and
social costs and benefits. When such a divergence occurs then the Pare-
to optimal conditions cannot be satisfied. This situation has touched
off much study and debate as attempts have been made to reconcile the
difference. Some of the efforts in this area will be discussed later
23






Next consider the interdependencies which arise due to a special
category of goods known in the literature as collective or public goods,
Before proceeding to an equilibrium analysis of an economic structure
which includes both private and collective goods, it is first necessary
to discuss the concept in general terms. Samuelson [Ref. 34] first
defined a "collective consumption good" as one
"which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual's
consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any
other individual's consumption of that good".
Such a good differs from a private good (or individual consumption
good) in one most significant way. A private good has the character-
istic that if one person consumes a unit of it nobody else can consume
that unit. My loaf of bread can be consumed by no one else. The total
amount of bread produced is equal to the sum of bread consumed by each
consumer. A collective good on the other hand is characterized by the
fact that the total amount produced must be consumed by each and every
individual. A person cannot decide unilaterally how much of a pure
collective good he will consume. In a later article Samuelson referred
to such a good as a "public consumption good" [Ref. 35]. Since then
the term "public good" has taken on several different connotations and
thus no longer can be used synonomously with "collective good" which
appears to have retained its original definition. Therefore when
For example Musgrave [Ref. 28] refers to a public good as one, "the in-
herent quality of which requires public production". It will be shown
that collectiveness does not imply public production. Buchanan [Ref. 4]
on the other hand calls any good or service which is demanded and supplied
through political institutions a public good. Duncan Foley [Ref. 19] adds
yet another distinction by defining a public good as one which requires
involuntary total consumption by all individuals. These examples are not
exhaustive but serve to illustrate the difficulty in attempting to recon-
cile the various uses of "public good" to some common denominator.
25

referring to a good which exhibits the equal consumption property it
shall be called a "collective good".
Typical examples of collective goods include national defense for
a nation, flood control for a geographical area, fire or police pro-
tection for a city or pleasant looking gardens and trees for a neighbor-
hood. Notice each of the examples includes a locational notion. This
becomes important when trying to define the group involved in a certain
economic structure. Examples such as these have been used throughout
the literature to illustrate the collective concept even though most
require locational or definitional qualifications. Only recently have
the problems associated with the environment been categorized as col-
lective but if closely examined it can be seen that the concept is very
intimately tied into the pollution woes. Many cases of pollution
involve some "good" (such as smoke which blocks out the sun) the total
effect of which is equally consumed by all members of the group. Add-
itionally any scheme whereby a pollutant is removed or cleaned up again
will effect all individuals equally.
Much of the early criticism of Samuelson's theory wax a direct
result of his stringent definition of a collective good. Almost any
example of a collective good could be shown to be restricted in the
equal consumption requirement. For instance many common public services
such as highways, courts of law and police protection are subject to
capacity limitations which are usually met long before the good has been
made equally available to all [Ref. 24]. Most writing in the field of
collective goods has now come to the understanding that most services
and goods which exhibit the collective characteristics need not do so
in the extreme manner of Samuelson's definition. It is recognized
26

that there are optional collective goods whereby persons can choose the
amount he wishes to consume. A specific example might be television
(via the radio spectrum, not cable) which possesses the collective
characteristic but which need not be consumed in total by every indi-
vidual. There can also be semi-optional goods such as street lighting.
A person can choose whether he wants to live in a lighted area or not.
If he opts for lighting then he must consume it. Yet he need not con-
sume the same amount as everybody else because his relative location
with respect to the lights determines the amount he consumes. And then
finally there are non-optional goods which must be consumed by all but
not necessarily in equal amounts. It will be shown subsequently that
all of the above mentioned types of collective goods give essentially
analogous conclusions in the equilibrium analysis.
In an attempt to relate collective goods to other economic concepts
we shall now investigate the joint supply characteristic. Clearly
once the good is produced a unit of it may be made equally available to
all and thus it is "jointly supplied". In reality, however, many times
a service will suffer a loss of quality as the number of consumers
increases. An example might be an airport which offers a collective
service the quality of which varies with the number of people it ser-
vices. As traffic through the airport increases, the services provided
each customer decreases. Theoretically each consumer receives equal
service but the amount is less. Samuelson took note of the contro-
versy and in his second article he admitted that his collective good
should be regarded only as an "extreme polar case", the other pole
being the "logically - extreme category of a private good". He went
on to make the point however that even though a good or service did
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not fit his extreme definition it could not be assumed that this auto-
matically placed it in the private good category. Most examples of
the economic functions of government are actually "a blending of the
extreme antipodal models" [Ref. 35]. It has even been shown that some
purely private individual consumption goods and services possess
characteristics of a pure collective consumption good [Ref. 41]. As
a result, Head, in his review of Samuelson's theory, stated that
"Jointness thus remains an essential characteristic of a public
(collective) good in the less extreme sense that a given unit
of the good, once produced, can be made at least partially
available, though possibly in varying degrees, to more than
one individual. Only beyond a point does additional consumption
by one person imply the need for a corresponding reduction in
consumption by others." [Ref. 21].
Since the concept of "partially available" is difficult to inter-
pret in an analytical sense, we will continue to represent a collective
good as one which embodies the equal consumption characteristic. Upon
completion of the analysis to follow it will be shown that relaxation
of the equal consumption requirement does not affect basic conclusions
concerning optimality.
Next it is important to observe that the concepts of collective
goods and externalities are closely related. First, in simple terms,
consider a collective service such as cleaning up a beach. Suppose
only one half of the people who normally use the beach join in the
clean up action. Clearly their utility will be increased when the
clean up is completed but in addition the other half who also use the
beach will experience a similar increase in utility. That is, their
utility becomes a function of the services "purchased" by others and
therefore a clear situation involving an external economy exists.




The issue here again revolves about the exclusion principle or
actually the "impossibility of exclusion". It becomes extremely costly
for a firm or individual to exclude non-payers from the benefits (if
not full at least partial benefit) arising from the production or con-
sumption of a collective good. Musgrave relates collective goods and
impossibility of exclusion through his definition of "social wants"
which he calls "those wants satisfied by services which must be con-
sumed in equal amounts by all. People who do not pay for the serivces
cannot be excluded from the benefits that result..." [Ref. 28]. There-
fore the Samuelson collective good exhibits external economies (or
diseconomies) to an extreme degree and properly belongs in any dis-
g
cussion of market inefficiency due to externalities.
Consider now an analytical description of a perfect competition
economy of private and pure collective goods. Harking back to the
pure private goods world, recall that there were s individuals, k firms
and m commodities. Now instead of all m commodities being private goods
let (x. , x_ , . ... x ) be private goods and (x ,,. x ._, .... x ) be pure12 n n+1 n+2 m
collective goods. Thus each of the s individuals must consume an amount
















where x . >.
1
. is the amount of the (n+1) good produced by the j firm.
g
Much of the preceding was based upon thoughts presented by J. G. Head
[Ref. 21]. For a somewhat different examination of the role of the
exclusion principle in theory of externalities, see R. Millward,
"Exclusion Costs, External Economies, and Market Failure," Oxford
Economic Papers
,
March 1970. In this article Millward examines exclu-
sion costs, as separate from production costs, and the necessity of
exclusion facilities in a market system. The inapplicability of the
exclusion principle to collective goods is, in his opinion, due to the
infinite cost of exclusion facilities for these goods.
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Assume further that there are no private good external effects; an
individual's utility is a function only of the goods (private or col-
lective) which each actually consumes. Similarly each firm's production
function depends only upon its own output. From the consumer's utility
viewpoint there is no difference between the private and collective
goods. He still prefers one bundle of goods to another and these
bundles include both private and collective goods. Thus each consumer's
utility function can be represented by
(18) U = U (x. 1} x...,x. ,x, x..,x. );jl j2 J" j(n+l) j(n+2)' jm'
(j = 1,2,. ..,k)
and the production function for the j firm becomes
(19) F J (x , x , ..., x. , -k , x ..., x. ) =0jl j2 jn' j(n+l)' j(n+2)' jm'
(i = 1,2,. ..,s)
The x 's carry the same interpretation as when previously used in the
strictly private goods world. The social welfare function (see equation
(3)) will again be utilized in the maximization of utility with the
resulting Lagrangian:
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for collective goods (r = n+1, n+2 , ..., m)
c»>
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Equations (23) and (23a) indicate that if x and x. are positive
(that is, produced) in the optimal allocation then equations (21) and
(22) hold with strict equality. Once more the set of equations are
solvable even though the computational techniques might be complex.
The interesting question again concerns the attainability of these
conditions by tne market mechanism.
Referring back to the analysis of the pure private goods world the
identity of equation (21) with equation (8) implies that equation (10)
is applicable to the private goods in this mixed goods world. Thus
by analogy, at least where private goods alone are concerned, the
optimal solution can be attained through the price mechanism. This
really is of little importance when considered alone, however, because
a person does not conciously separate out the private and collective
goods in his utility function.




as previously considered. The marginal rate of product transformation
9
Private good h 1 could be considered a numeraire and then the marginal
rates of substitution referred to in the text could actually be con-
sidered marginal valuations. Mishan [Ref. 26] used this approach to













between the collective and private good is no longer equal to the rate
of commodity substitution for each consumer but rather is equal to the




Even so the solution will be Pare to optimal if these conditions can
be satisfied.
One thing is clear from the preceding analysis and that is the
fact that where collective goods are concerned it is no longer an
individual consumer who alone decides what quantity of the good he
will consume. Rather the entire community must somehow relate to each
other their individual valuation of the collective good and then these
individual valuations added and equated to the marginal cost of the
collective good. Since we have not assumed uniform preference rankings
for all consumers we cannot in turn assume "equal shares" of marginal
cost.
In order to gain the fullest significance from these results it is
necessary to again resort to an argument in dynamics. First and prob-
ably most important it is the opinion of all those who have studied
collective goods in the equilibrium context that even though a Pareto
optimal solution is theoretically possible there is no way that the
pricing system will attain such a point. Samuelson [Ref. 34] said it
first and every economist since has agreed that a decentralized pricing
system will not optimally determine the levels of collective consumption
The fundamental reason for the failure of the market system is gen-
erally felt to be that there is no mechanism available which will force
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consumers to reveal their true preferences for collective goods. The
consensus is that the "rational" consumer will understate his preference
for a collective good and hope to gain the full benefit at the expense
of others. Since all consumers are assumed to be rational, they all
would behave in the same manner and thus if decisions were left to
prices as determined by the market alone the only collective goods
which would be produced would be those jointly produced with a private
good.
This problem has been the subject of much recent study including
various schemes for optimally providing public goods to specified
localities and the theory of group decisions and actions. Note
especially the work of Williams [Ref. 43], Connolly [Ref. 11] and
Tiebout [Ref. 39]. Certainly the larger the group the more difficult
and costly it becomes to obtain agreement upon a quantity of a collective
good to be consumed by all. "Herein lies the explanation of the failure
of market- like or exchange organization to function effectively in sup-
plying public goods that jointly supply large groups" [Ref. 4]. A
political or voting scheme is presently used to obtain consumer prefer-
ences for many of the non-private ly supplied collective goods.
Now to recap briefly, two types of external effects have been
applied to the perfect competition model. First external economies
and diseconomies effected by producers upon consumers (and by consumers
upon each other) were examined. The result was a divergence between
social cost and private cost which could not be reconciled by the
market mechanism alone. Next externalities caused by collective goods
were investigated and it was concluded that because of failure to
reveal true preferences for these goods, a market type exchange mechanism
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could not determine the optimal quantity of this type good. Both of
these conditions can be directly related to the environmental pollution
problem. Most pollution is the result of actions which fall explicitly
into the category of the externalities first studied. The clean up of
a polluted area can be considered a classical example of a Samuelsonian




V. INTERNALIZING THE EXTERNALITIES
For the final analysis of the study consider a world which includes
private goods with external effects. However instead of representing
an externality as an effect of the consumption or production of the
precursor good consider it to be itself, a good. That is, in previous
analyses an external diseconomy of production, smoke for instance, was
accounted for by making each person's utility a function of the quantity
of the precursor good consumed. In the present situation it is desirous
to treat the external diseconomy, smoke, as a good which may be consumed
by individuals. The reason for characterizing externalities in this
manner is to attempt to "internalize" the externality. That is to
obtain an equilibrium solution in which the Pareto optimal conditions
infer some method of pricing (or taxing) the externality.
In order to follow somewhat the previous notation we will again
consider a world of s consumers and k firms. Let goods x
1
through x
be private goods and x
.
, through x be external economies and dis-r n+1 m
economies. A necessary assumption for this analysis is that the
externalities, be they economies or diseconomies, are producer initiated.
Consider each of the "goods" x ., through x as outputs of firms and
n+1 m
these commodities are consumed by individuals of the community. As
such they will appear in the production and utility functions. Text-
book formulation of the implicit production functions normally embraces
only those inputs and outputs for which a price can be associated. For
instance if air is used as a factor of production it usually is not in-
cluded in the production function (unless it must be purified before
use). Similarly even if noise or air pollutants are "joint products"
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along with the salable products they are not "normally" included in the
production functions.
There is no assumption made as to the collective characteristics
of the external economies or diseconomies. An attempt is being made
here to structure the problem so that there are no "collective" goods,
services or externalities. That is, the producer produces only "my
goods and your goods" and "mine" are always separate and distinct from
"yours". Therefore only "private" type characterizations of commodities
is present
.
Thus each utility function will be of the form
,OCN TT i TT i , i i i i i s(25) U =U (x.,, x. OJ ..., x. , x., ..,., ..., x. );jl j2' jn' j(n+l)' jm
(j = 1,2,...,k)
and production functions
(26) F J (x* x* ..., x. , x.. 1XI ..., x. ) = 0;jl j2' jn' j(n+l)' jm
(i = 1,2,. ..,s).
Utilizing the familiar maximization techniques of earlier sections, the
equilibrium conditions become
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The conditions for "ordinary" private goods have been discussed
previously. What is important in this model is the interpretation
given to this characterization of external effects. From equation
(29) comparing an external effect with the standard private good 3 h' ,















The right hand side of (30) is similar to the rate of product trans-
formation for private and collective goods. Previous discussion has
shown that RPT to be equal to the ratio of prices for the goods
involved. The Pareto optimal conditions are also characterized by
equality between the rate of commodity substitution between two private
goods and their price ratio. Recall for collective goods, however,
that it is the sum of all individual's RCS which is equal to the RPT
for that good.
From (29) and (30) we have conditions which appear to be analogous
to the pure private goods world; that is, the rate of product trans-
formation between an external effect and some standard private good is
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is equal to the consumers rate of commodity substitution. It now
becomes necessary to interpret what is meant by RPT and RCS between
some external effect and a private good or numeraire.
First from the firm's point of view the incidental nature of the
external effect makes it very difficult to control the quantity of this
"good" produced. Usually an external effect is unintentional in that
it normally is a by product of some legitimate process and not a
purposeful product [Ref. 26]. Also for the most part externalities
are not marketable in the normal sense. Consumers will not pay a
price for the privilege of "consuming" an externality. The reasons
for this have been discussed earlier but to reiterate; first if an
external economy is involved people realize that exclusion of the
benefit from them is extremely costly and thus they will be supplied
it whether they pay or not. Secondly if we are dealing with an
external diseconomy a rational person would not pay a positive price
for a disutility causing product. They may, however, be willing to
pay for the removal or elimination of that product. It therefore would
probably not be in a firm's interest to shift resources from a product
for which a price, as commonly thought of, could be obtained to an
external effect which would gain them no revenue. This might be
disputed by some actual firms which have in recent months made announce-
ments concerning funds which they have allocated for devices and methods
of production which have no purpose other than the reduction of contam-
inating waste. It is highly unlikely that such actions have been
influenced solely by the market pricing system however. More plausibly
government pressure and "public opinion", both of which are external to
the market, are the motivating forces for these acts. Even though the
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consumer may indirectly compensate the firm through increased prices of
the normal outputs, this does not really fit the model under present
consideration.
Regarding the same situation from the viewpoint of the consumer
note first that a utility function is a ranking of preference between
different bundles of goods. Certainly a rational consumer would
rather have a bundle of goods which included zero quantity of a good
which provided dissatisfaction if consumed. Mathematically speaking
a diseconomy can be characterized for the consumer by r— < where
dx
x is some quantity of a diseconomy producing good. Therefore the
rate of commodity substitution between an external diseconomy and any
private good which provides positive utility would be negative. Thus
using the price ratio analogy this indicates that the consumer would
be willing to "pay" a negative price for the privilege of "consuming"
the diseconomy. Or turning it around the consumer will pay to get rid
of a commodity which provides negative utility. So in theory there is
some "price" which could be used to determine the optimal quantity of
a diseconomy good to be supplied. The mechanism by which the "price"
would be established is not clear and is surely not to be proposed in
-U- 10this paper.
Shapley and Shubik have used the game theory concept of the core of an
n person cooperative game to show that a Pareto optimal competitive
equilibrium exists under certain conditions involving externalities.
In particular a pure private goods world in perfect competition with
externalities in production was considered. The external effects were
assumed to affect production processes and consumers directly through
their utility functions. It was shown that if the externality was an
economy (beneficial effects only) a Pareto optimal competitive equilib-
rium existed in all cases but if the externality was a diseconomy this
was not always the case. They found wide diversity of core behavior
when considering various examples of external diseconomies. There are
no general conclusions for use of the core in examining external dis-
economies although specific case-by-case application may be enlightening
with regard to prospective Pareto optimum. Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin





Although the collectiveness of goods has been assumed away in this
model it is this very fact (collectiveness) which appears to be the
blocking effect in allowing this structure to reach its Pareto optimal
conditions. As was seen in the private-collective goods model once a
commodity begins to exhibit a collective characteristic it becomes
impossible for one individual alone to determine the amount of that
good which he will consume. Since most externalities are collective in
nature it seems that even though the model requires "my goods and your
goods" as separate entities, in actuality there will be some "our goods"
There are some situations, however, in which one individual consumes
the entire amount of an external effect and all others consume none.
Coase [Ref. 10] gives an example of such a situation involving a con-
fectioner and a doctor who because of his close proximity to the con-
fectioner's kitchen "consumed" all of the vibration and noise generated.
Although this case was settled judicially it does seem as if it might
have been handled through a price -like mechanism. The important point
here is that if only two persons are involved the likelihood of a
decentralized (no outside interference) solution is increased. When
more than one individual has an interest on either side a collective
solution is necessary. As previously determined a market system prob-
ably will not be efficient in allocating resources and distributing
goods
.
If in theory a world with private goods and "internalized" external
effects has an equilibrium, can this point be attained in practice?
At first glance most observers would answer this question in the nega-
tive; at least without some sort of centralized interference most would
agree that such a bliss point will not be reached. The next few para-
graphs will attempt to outline a few of the difficulties which prevent
reaching the Pareto optimal point.
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Returning to the environmental pollution problem, consider first
the case of external diseconomies. A giant problem looms in the area
of specifying the actual effect of the diseconomy upon those involved.
As an example consider a factory which produces a single output, and
in the process dumps its waste into a river which flows past the factory
and on for several miles. Suppose the dumping costs the factory nothing.
Suppose also that the waste causes the following effects: (a) ruins a
previously well used recreational area, (b) contaminates the fish which
thrive in the river and are regularly taken from some downstream area
for human consumption, (c) forces a downstream firm to utilize additional
funds to purify the water prior to use in its own production process.
Now clearly we have here an example of externality in its most classic
sense. The factors of locality and measurement now come into play.
To a non-fish eating individual with no desire for water recreation
but who enjoys the commodity produced by the factory, the dumping of
the waste into the river provides no external diseconomy. It might even
provide this person with an external economy because he probably pays
less for the commodity than if the factory had to divert some of its
resources to process waste. Suppose another group of individuals can
no longer use the river for boating and swimming. Although the services
lost by those no longer able to use the river for recreation could be
measured, say in hours of recreation per month, this does not necessarily
indicate the "utils" they attach to the services lost. If they obtain
similar recreational services but at a different location the cost of
reaching the new area could be used as an indication of the value they
place upon such services. Of course others may substitute other forms
of recreation for which they will very likely experience less utility.
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Consider now those persons who consumed the contaminated fish. The
result to them could vary from none to a shortened life span and could
include all sorts of maladies in between. Once again it is nearly
impossible to provide a uniform and meaningful way to compare utility
between persons. Then consider the factory which must purify its
water. At least we can quantify the external diseconomy because the
cost of purification can be directly related to the amount of waste
dumped by the offending plant.
The point of this example is to demonstrate that one action, the
dumping of waste, can affect many groups each in a different way.
These groups may or may not consume the "real" output of the factory.
If they do then possibly some type of equilibrium could be reached on
an individual basis. But if they do not consume the product and con-
sidering the diverse measures of disutility it seems highly unlikely
that a decentralized method could gain a Pareto optimal equilibrium
point
.
In practice incidents whereby consumers voluntarily enter into
agreement with producers to settle upon a price for an external
economy or diseconomy are few and far between. If a firm cannot
exclude consumers from the benefit there is no way they can force
payment. Additionally if firms contaminate a medium such as the air
or water over which there are no property rights, then certainly they
will not voluntarily contribute a reduction of the diseconomy at their
own expense. The fact that the theoretical equilibrium discussed above
is not actually attainable in real life has been the subject of much
study in recent years. This study, although sometimes carried out in
the context of equilibrium analysis, is actually an investigation of
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the processes involved in moving the system from disequilibrium to
equilibrium. The line between disequilibrium analysis and equilibrium
analysis is quite fine in many areas. Thus many authors move back and
forth from one to the other quite indiscriminately.
As has been noted earlier disequilibrium type discussions are
necessary in order to determine the usefulness of the equilibrium
analyses. The Pareto optimal conditions may not be attainable and
this can only be seen through dynamic analysis. Previous note has
been made of the so called divergence between private and social
benefits caused by external effects. Although as we have seen there
are conditions which if satisfied would still lead to a Pareto optimal
situation, the general opinion throughout the literature seems to be
that a decentralized pricing mechanism will not result in such an
optimum. Several policy alternatives have been proposed and these will
be briefly discussed in the following paragraphs.
The tax-subsidy policy has already been mentioned as one method of
equating private and social costs. Until ten or fifteen years ago
most economists subscribed to this scheme as the one which should be
followed. Its basic premise is to levy a tax upon whoever creates an
external diseconomy (or subsidize the producer of an external economy).
Problems which arise when attempting such a policy include how much the
tax should be, what the tax should be levied upon and who should obtain
the revenue gained by the tax. Economists and others are not generally
in agreement on any of these difficulties [Ref. 10, 31].
More recent work has indicated that regulating an externality with
a government initiated tax scheme may be extremely difficult if not
impossible [Ref. 7, 40]. The problem lies in the lack of information
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about utility and cost functions from which equitable taxes can be
determined. An alternative proposed by Davis and Whinston is based
upon the motivation of two firms (or more) to merge, thus eliminating
the externalities which they exert upon each other. Their model uses
game theory to show the extreme difficulty involved in creating an
effective tax scheme to compensate for certain types of externalities.
Although severely restricted as to the interactions to which their
analysis applies (producer-producer reciprocal) they are still able to
11
point out the informational problems facing tax-subsidy policy makers.
Closely allied with this is the "bartering" approach which has been
proposed by several authors. Essentially it is postulated that if the
offending party and the party suffering the damage are willing and
able to negotiate to their mutual advantage then there is no need for
outside intervention in order to gain an optimal resource allocation.
Bargaining is not restricted to any particular type of external inter-
action but there are some situations in which it would not be a
reasonable alternative. Such cases might include a situation in which
a large group is involved and the members cannot get together to
to bargain or when their interests are diverse due to non-uniform
Otto A. Davis and Andrew Whinston 9 "Externalities, Welfare, and the
Theory of Games," Journal of Political Economy , June 1962. A problem
which is recognized by the authors concerns the possible alteration
of the market structure due to mergers. That is in order to truly
"internalize" an externality such widespread mergers might be necessary
that the result is a monopolistic rather than a competitive market.
It would then be necessary to determine whether the welfare gained
through mergers outweighed the welfare lost through market alteration.




consumption of the externality. (As in the river example cited
previously). Of course there is no unanimity in any of the alternate
proposals [Ref. 42]. The most logical approach toward the problem
would be to consider each as having merit under certain circumstances.
The legal aspects of external effects are becoming more important
because of the increasing number of conflicts involving legal rights.
The costs involved in mergers and bargaining also may be significant.
As an example these costs might include the cost of identifying all
members of the effected group, finding a unified course of action and
the actual bargaining. The possibility also exists of finding a
judicial solution in case governmental tax-subsidy, merger and bargain-
ing all fail [Ref. 8].
In general we must conclude from the preceding that even if the
market system will not automatically reach its equilibrium when
externalities are present other methods do exist for attaining an
optimal allocation of resources. What must be understood, however, is
12
Apparently the bargaining approach was first expounded by Coase [Ref.
10]. He was most concerned about the evident disregard by economists
of the effects upon society of the tax-subsidy measurements. He advo-
cated an approach which would consider the total effect of a given
social arrangement and as a result the bargaining tactic appeared to
merit some further study. Buchanan and Stubblebine [Ref. 7] expounded
upon this theme and concluded the unilaterally imposed taxes would not
be sufficient to attain Pareto optimality in the case of the extern-
alities. Rather the total benefits must be weighed against the net
costs to determine whether any intervention is required at all. Whinston
and Davis proceeded to develop an iterative type model for bargaining
which allowed individuals to gain knowledge of each other's preferences.
Additionally they raised the question of the legal status quo. In other
words the result of the bargaining process depends to a large degree
upon the legal arrangements which initially govern the situation. The
point is made again however that should the externality be imposed
upon a large number of persons the tax-subsidy scheme may be more use-
ful than bargaining. Otto A. Davis and Andrew B. Whinston, "Some Dtes





that at present there is no general theoretical approach which applies
to all situations. Actually the final equilibrium might be found
using a combination of the proposed alternatives. It is not the pur-
pose here to make any attempt to rank the proposals or to even try to
specify situations in which one method may be superior. Rather they
have been used to point out the directions in which many economists
have been concentrating their effort in recent years. Many of our
most pressing problems (not only environmental pollution) appear in
theory to fall under the cognizance of welfare economics. In the words
of Wellisz [Ref. 42], "Perhaps... the welfare economists could do better
than "practical men" if only they were able to apply their skills to




There are several areas of extreme interest and relevance which have
not been discussed but deserve mentioning as possible areas of further
study. The first of these involves the optimal supply of public goods
where public is used to mean collective goods supplied by governmental
means. The nature of the necessary conditions for optima lity in the
world which included collective goods has led many economists to the
conclusion that the market system alone will not attain a Pareto
optimal equilibrium. The major reason which has been advanced deals
with the high probability of false preference rankings by individuals.
This is extremely difficult to verify empirically and is more a "feeling"
on the part of those advocating this cause than actual fact. Certainly
there is nothing to prevent a society to develop the customs and mores
necessary to insure accurate representation of preferences but apparently
this is thought to be an exception in our highly industrialized world.
If we accept that the pricing system alone will not optimally supply
our public goods the question which naturally arises is "How do we
determine the supply of public goods?" Obviously many public goods are
being supplied now, have been in the past and will be in the future.
What mechanism was used to decide upon the present mix of public goods
and is this mix optimal? These questions and others directly related
have provided impetus for several authors, notably Downs [Ref. 18],
Black [Ref. 3], Olson [Ref. 29], and Buchanan [Ref. 6], to study the
theory of group action. These writings are extremely interesting and
provide some very thought provoking conclusions which are b*} ond the
scope of this paper but which definitely provide an area for further
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research. Clearly this has applicability to environmental pollution
since the clean up of much of the contamination will very likely be
accomplished collectively.
A problem which always seems to appear in any study of externalities
is that of properly categorizing the external effect. An externality
can be interpreted in many different ways and herein lies one of the
greatest difficulties in reconciling the thoughts of various authors.
The parameters of time and locality very often become important when
characterizing the effect of some action. Sometimes they are considered
and sometimes not.
Although this study has tended to look at the economy as a whole,
this certainly does not imply that such methods must be restricted to
a whole economy. Actually one of the new areas of investigation con-
cerns the theory of resource allocation within a firm or organization.
That is, the different divisions of an organization, be it government
or private, normally compete for funds to carry out its specific
tasks. Many times externalities will be exerted by one division upon
another. Thus if a method to optimally allocate resources in a com-
petitive market with external effects is known it might be able to be
made applicable to government and industry [Ref. 32].
Finally since we opened this paper with a discussion of environ-
mental pollution, we shall close with a brief review of the status.
There are really no theoretical economic solutions to the pollution
problem. Buchanan has, however, advanced an equilibrium model which
attempts to explain in simple terms some reasons for pollution. He
notes that in the past there has been a cult of "do gooders", those
who see their public duty and do it. There are many examples,
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especially in the less populated areas, where a certain group of well
off individuals has provided goods and services which benefit the
entire community with no apparent compensation. The problem of
pollution, however, appears to be too large to be corrected by the
voluntary action of a few. According to Buchanan we must "...change
the structure of property rights which will make exclusion less costly
or shift from voluntary individual and group behavior to some more
inclusive collective and coercive action through the political process"
[Ref. 5].
Ayers and Kneese [Ref. 1] have approached the problem from a
completely different route. Theirs is a materials flow analysis
which uses as its base the Walras-Cassel general equilibrium model.
The information required at equilibrium is no different than that
which was shown here in to be necessary for our perfect competition
model. That is all preference and production functions must be known
as well as all factor and process substitution. Thus it brings us no
closer to a satisfactory answer as to whether a Pare to optimum can be
reached or not.
The complexity of the problems concerning externalities and col-
lective goods, both central to the control of pollution, have been
enumerated. No particular solution is offered but surely one must
realize that only positive action will solve our problems. Pollution
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